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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 782a-3(2)(J)(1996).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court error in failing to quiet title in the Plaintiffs.

2.

Was the district court's decision inconsistent with the Utah Court of

Appeal's previous appellate decision, thus violating the law of the case doctrine.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is a quiet title action , and "[a] quiet title action necessarily involves an
ultimate conclusion of law as to whom owns the disputed piece of property. In reviewing
the trial court's conclusions of law, we accord them no particular deference but review
them for correctness." Falula Farms, Inc v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App.
1993)(citing Oates v. Chavez. 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988)).
The issues in this case raise questions of law which must be reviewed on appeal
for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); MacKintosh v.
Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court's decision in this case also
interprets Utah statutes. "A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of
law which is reviewed on appeal for correctness." Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757,
759 (Utah 1990). The trial court's decision is therefore entitled to no deference. In the
event this court determines the decision of the trial court constitutes a mixed question of
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fact and law, a correction of its standard applies, or the "clearly erroneous standards of
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)." Termude v. Cook. 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah
1990) (per curium).
These issues were raised below and addressed by the trial court in its ruling of
February 17, 1995 (R. 241) and the finding of fact and conclusions of law of May 19,
1999. (R.250), as well as this court in Nelson v. Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (March 1994).
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE IN THIS APPEAL
These statutes are either determinative or of central importance in the present
matter. These statutes are reproduced in Appendix A or in the body of the Brief.
1.

Federal Townsite Act, ch. 177, 14 Stat. 541 (1867)

2.

Utah Township Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-1 (1953, as amended)

3.

C.L. 17,2801

4.

CLU§2071.§7(1888)

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-7 (1953, as amended)

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (1953, as amended 1991)

Also attached hereto in Appendix B are copies of cases plaintiffs maintain are
determinative in this matter.
4.

Nelson v. Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994)

5.

Falula Farms. Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter has previously been reviewed by this court in Nelson v. Provo City.
872 P.2d 35 (March 1994). A copy of the opinion is attached in Appendix B. The
original ruling of the trial court was reversed and remanded. Upon remand the trial court
ruled:
The Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion cited as Nelson v. Provo City.
872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994). The facts are essentially undisputed, and
this court lists the facts substantially the same as the Court of Appeals.
(R.241).
The Court of Appeals stated the facts as follows which remained the facts upon remand:
Pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1869, the federal government
deeded the roadway along with the abutting lands in trust to the local
municipality authority Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee (the
Townsite conveyance). The roadway existed as a public thoroughfare prior
to this conveyance. The parties do not dispute that landowners,
predecessors and interest do not occupy the roadway or the abutting
property at the time of the townsite conveyance. Nor do they dispute that
the meets and bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to the roadway
but did not specifically exclude it.
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the roadway to James Dunn, who in
1876 deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a portion of the Stubbs'
parcel was deeded to appellants Steven Whitlock and Shiela Whitlock. In
1985, Steven Whitlock alone received another portion of the Stubbs'parcel.
Finally, in 1991, Appellants Boyd Nelson and Lorraine Nelson received a
deed for another portion of the Stubbs'parcel.
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the roadway to John P.R. Johnson, as
trustee of the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, First Ward Pasture
Company deeded its parcel to the city. Nine Hundred South continued to be
used as a public roadway.
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In its regularly scheduled meeting of August 22, 1999, the Provo Municipal
Counsel passed Ordinance Number 0-89-055, which purported to vacate
and set aside the roadway. After passing the ordinance, the city published
notice one time in the Provo Daily Herald on August 31, 1989. The city
mailed no notice of the vacation to the abutting land owners either before or
after the fact. The city then rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the
property owned to the south of the original route and sold the vacated
portion of the original route to a commercial developer. The vacation of the
roadway landlocked one lot south and deprived two other lots of access to
900 South.
Landowners sued city claiming a reversionary interest in the roadway from
their property lines to the middle of the roadway. They sought
compensation, and, in the alternative, the setting aside of the vacation. City
counterclaimed for quiet title to the roadway.
On July 6, 1992, the trial court quieted title in the city as against
landowners, concluding that the city held fee simple title since the time of
the townsite conveyance. Landowners moved for specific findings
regarding city's compliance with the Townsite Act and the State Township
Act. The trial court denied the motion. Landowners appeal.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35-36. See Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 250). The
Court of Appeals in Nelson held:
Landowners claim that city could not have acquired title to 900 South under
the patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a
deed. We agree.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37(emphasis added). The Nelson court also noted:
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the state's supposing legislation,
provides that townsite's conveyance transferred land to a municipality and
trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any
other claimant, would have to obtain a deed.
Here, the parties agree that city never explicitly reserves the roadway or
obtained a deed to the roadway pursuant to § 57-7-8 or -17. Thus, city
remains the holder of the roadway in trust. City purported to vacate the
4

roadway as absolute owner, without regard to its responsibilities as trustee
under the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the
trial court to consider the city's role as trustee of the roadway, with it
attendant fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, in this case, the collective
occupants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718.
Id at 35. The Court of Appeals in Nelson specifically held that the city did not own the
property in absolute ownership. Id at 38. The Nelson court also recognized that title to
the property at the time of the Townsite Act was "in the United States." Id at 36.
This court held:
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust
only; (2) hold that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway pursuant to
statute[.]
Id at 38.
Upon remand, the Fourth Judicial District Court held that it was not necessary for
the city to formally vacate the roadway. The trial court's ruling as well as the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are attached in Appendix C. The trial court emphasized its
own holding in direct contravention of the Court of Appeal's holding that the city held
title to the property. The Trial court ruled:
In the Court's determination, the fact that the City held title to the land on
which the Roadway was located (albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that
the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the grant of easement which
would carry with it a reversionary interest.
(R. 238). The trial court further concluded that the city owned the land where the
roadway had been and that, therefore, the city did not need to vacate the roadway.
Instead, the trial court concluded the City could simply sell the property, which the City
5

had ostensibly done. The trial court therefore concluded:
This Court believes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and
responsibility when it determined that it was in the best interest of the
collective occupants of the city of Provo to realign the Roadway to create a
functional intersection, and when it sold the Roadway property which it
held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the general
treasury for the benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo.
(R.238).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In 1871 the determinative actions in this matter took place. An east to west
running street, 900 South in Provo, already existed, and pursuant to state law the street
was a dedicated roadway. Connected with the Federal Townsite Act, A.O. Smoot
transferred title to all land both north and south of 900 South by way of deeds, which
deeds did not expressly exclude 900 South. At that point in time, the rights of the
abutting landowners were fixed. Pursuant to existing law, which remains effective today,
those grants conveyed the property to the center line of the Roadway. Accordingly, in
1871, looking to the future, should the roadway ever be vacated or abandoned, or cease to
be used as a Roadway, the title to the property would revert to the abutting landowners.
In the present case, that precipitating event occurred many years later - in 1989 when Provo City attempted to vacate the property, and in fact purported to sell the
property to a private third party. However, the result is the same. The legal effect of
Provo City's action in moving 900 South and abandoning the property was to vest fee
simple title in the plaintiffs by operation of law.
6

The trial court below erred in holding that Provo City held title to old 900 South.
Upon that erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court then proceeded to further erroneous
conclusions. The trial court's determination must be overturned because (1) the trial
court ignored and refused to follow this court's earlier opinion and rule consistent with
the law of the case, and (2) the trial court misapplied the applicable law. In particular,
the trial court did not presume that the original conveyances were to the middle of the
Roadway as required by Utah law. Further, the trial misconstrued whether Provo City
had title to the Roadway. This case demands remand with specific instruction to quiet
title in the plaintiffs.
The trial court did not apply the law of the case. This court's ruling in Nelson v.
Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) was legally binding on the trial court. The
Court of Appeals in Nelson held:
Landowners claim that city could not have acquired title to 900 South under
the patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a
deed. We agree.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37(emphasis added). This court also noted:
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the state's supposing legislation,
provides that townsite's conveyance transferred land to a municipality and
trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any
other claimant, would have to obtain a deed.
Here, the parties agree that city never explicitly reserves the roadway or
obtained a deed[.]
This court held:
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We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust
only; (2) hold that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway pursuant to
statute[.]
Id at 38.
Upon remand, the Fourth Judicial District Court held that it was not necessary for
the city to formally vacate the roadway. The trial court emphasized that the city held title
to the property. (R. 238). The trial court further concluded that the city owned the land
where the roadway had been and that, therefore, the city did not need to vacate the
roadway. Instead, the trial court concluded the City could simply sell the property, which
the City had ostensibly done. The trial court's legal conclusions are at odds with the law
of this case and must therefore be reversed.
The transfer of land bounded by a roadway passes title to the center of the
roadway. The law presumes that transfer of land bounded by highway passes title to the
center of the highway. The trial court ignored this presumption. In the absence of
evidence that the original grantor specifically intended to exclude the Roadway, the trial
court should have presumed that title was transferred to the center of the Roadway. This
conclusion is supported by long-standing Utah law.
Utah law has always provided and remains consistent that land bounded by a street
when a transfer is made passes title to the center of the street. The properties in the
present appeal are bounded by property which used to be a street. As this court ruled in
Nelson, the parties do not dispute "that the metes and bounds of each subsequent
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conveyance ran to the Roadway but did not specifically exclude it." Nelson, 872 P.2d at
35-36. Accordingly, when A.O. Smoot originally deeded the property to plaintiffs
predecessors in interest, on both the north and south boundaries of the Roadway, the
grants ran to the middle of the Roadway by operation of law. Therefore, the trial court
erred when it ruled that the title to the property should be quieted in Provo City.
Upon vacation or abandonment of the street, the fee reverted to the abutting
property owners. In Nelson this court did not determine the exact interest which Provo
City held when 900 South was moved. This court only held:
Here, we determine that whether City's interest was that of a determinable
fee or fee simple, the interest was held only in trust.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37, fn. 2. Within the City's role as trustee, the City could vacate or
abandon old 900 South when it determined that a better route for 900 South existed. The
City could not, however, change the legal consequence of this action, which was that the
Roadway reverted to the abutting property owners. The City breached its fiduciary duties
when the City attempted to deed property which it did not own. After the decision to
move 900 South was reached and traffic was no longer upon old 900 South, the City as
trustee no longer had any interest in the Roadway.
The public only had an easement upon 900 South. Prior to the grant of 1871 all
parties agree that 900 South already existed. All parties also agree that at the time of the
grant, when Utah was still a territory of the United States, the land upon which 900 South
was situated was owned by the United States. Thus, the public had but an easement to
9

travel thereupon. The grant in 1871 did not change this fundamental interest. A.O.
Smoot only transferred property to the abutting landowners; the city received no deed, nor
did the City reserve the Roadway. The underlying reversionary interest was granted to
the abutting landowners long before 1989.
The trial court even recognized if all the City had was an easement, plaintiffs
theory upon which they maintained a right to a quiet title would prevail. The trial court
stated: "The Court believes that Plaintiffs' argument would have merit if the City and the
collective occupants of the city of Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use
the road." (R. 238). With the correct law applied, including this court's determinations
in Nelson, plaintiffs' position must prevail. Title must be quieted in the plaintiffs.
In this case, Provo City has de facto vacated, or more clearly abandoned old 900
South. Accordingly, the plaintiffs as abutting landowners own and should possess the
underlying property. When Provo City no longer used 900 South as a street and either
impliedly vacated it or abandoned its use, the city no longer had any legal interest in the
northern one-half of the street as it reverted to the plaintiffs herein as the successors of the
original grantees.
ARGUMENT
In 1871 the determinative actions in this matter took place. An east to west
running street, 900 South in Provo, already existed, and pursuant to state law the roadway
was dedicated. Connected with the Federal Townsite Act, A.O. Smoot transferred title to
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all land both north and south of 900 South by way of deeds, which deeds did not
expressly exclude 900 South. At that point in time, the rights of the abutting landowners
were fixed. Pursuant to existing law, which remains effective today, those grants
conveyed the property to the center line of the Roadway. Accordingly, in 1871, looking
to the future, should the roadway ever be vacated or abandoned, or cease to be used as a
Roadway, the title to the property would revert to the abutting landowners.
In the present case, that precipitating event occurred many years later - in 1989 when Provo City attempted to vacate the property, and in fact purported to sell the
property to a private third party. However, the result is the same. The legal effect of
Provo City's action in moving 900 South and abandoning the property was to vest fee
simple title in the plaintiffs by operation of law.
The trial court below erred in holding that Provo City held title to old 900 South.
Upon that erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court then proceeded to further erroneous
conclusions. The trial court's determination must be overturned because (1) the trial
court ignored and refused to follow this court's earlier opinion and rule consistent with
the law of the case, and (2) the trial court misapplied the applicable law. In particular,
the trial court did not presume that the original conveyances were to the middle of the
Roadway as required by Utah law. Further, the trial misconstrued whether Provo City
had title to the Roadway. This case demands remand with specific instruction to quiet
title in the plaintiffs.
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I.

The Trial Court Did Not Apply The Law Of The Case
This court's ruling in Nelson v. Provo Citv. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) was

legally binding on the trial court. Under the law of the case doctrine, a decision once
made is binding on successive stages of the same litigation. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d
734, 739 (Utah 1990). One prong of the law of the case doctrine is known as the mandate
rule which provides:
[Pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the
law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that
case.
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The lower court must
implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate. Id. This rule is inflexible and
requires even the appellate court to follow earlier pronouncements, even if the appellate
court on a subsequent appeal disagrees with an earlier determination.
The Court of Appeals in Nelson held:
Landowners claim that city could not have acquired title 1o 900 South under
the patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a
deed. We agree.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37. The Nelson court also noted:
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the state's supposing legislation,
provides that townsite's conveyance transferred land to a municipality and
trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any
other claimant, would have to obtain a deed.
Here, the parties agree that city never explicitly reserves the roadway or
obtained a deed to the roadway pursuant to § 57-7-8 or -17. Thus, city
remains the holder of the roadway in trust. City purported to vacate the
12

roadway as absolute owner, without regard to its responsibilities as trustee
under the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the
trial court to consider the city's role as trustee of the roadway, with it
attendant fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, in this case, the collective
occupants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718.
Id. at 35. The Court of Appeals in Nelson specifically held that the city did not own the
property in absolute ownership. Id at 38. The Nelson court also recognized that title to
the property at the time of the Townsite Act was "in the United States." Id. at 36.
This court held:
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust
only; (2) hold that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway pursuant to
statute[.]
Id at 38.
Upon remand, the Fourth Judicial District Court held that it was not necessary for
the city to formally vacate the roadway. The trial court emphasized its own ruling in
direct contravention of the Court of Appeals, that the city held title to the property. The
trial court ruled:
In the Court's determination, the fact that the City held title to the land on
which the Roadway was located (albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that
the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the grant of easement which
would carry with it a reversionary interest.
(R. 238). The trial court further concluded that the city owned the land where the
roadway had been and that, therefore, the city did not need to vacate the roadway.
Instead, the trial court concluded the City could simply sell the property, which the City
had ostensibly done. The trial court therefore concluded:
13

This Court believes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and
responsibility when it determined that it was in the best interest of the
collective occupants of the city of Provo to realign the Roadway to create a
functional intersection, and when it sold the Roadway property which it
held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the general
treasury for the benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo.
(R. 237).
The trial court's legal conclusions are at odds with the law of this case. This court
expressly held that Provo City did not obtain a deed, nor did the City reserve the
Roadway, and that therefore the City did not have title to the Roadway. The trial court
erred by ignoring this court's mandate. The trial court's further erroneous conclusions
flow from this mistake. Even the trial court recognized that if the City did not have title
then title would revert to the abutting landowners. (R. 238). The trial court's ruling must
be reversed.
II. THE TRANSFER OF LAND BOUNDED BY A ROADWAY PASSES TITLE
TO THE CENTER OF THE ROADWAY
The law presumes that transfer of land bounded by a highway passes title to the
center of the highway. The trial court ignored this presumption. In the absence of
evidence that the original grantor specifically intended to excluded the Roadway, the trial
court should have presumed that title was transferred to the center of the Roadway. This
conclusion is supported by long-standing Utah law.
"[A]t common law the owner of land which abutted a highway owned up to the
middle of the highway." Falula Farms. Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah App.
14

1993). A review of Utah law shows the Falula Farms court's conclusion to be accurate.
A review of the law at the time of the transfer at issue in this case independently shows
that as a matter of statutory law, when A.O. Smoot transferred the property, that transfer
was to the middle of the Roadway. The property description on the deeds at issue did not
exclude the Roadway. Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35. The trial court failed to appreciate that
had A.O. Smoot wanted to reserve the road or exclude the road from the deeds, he could
have so acted, but he did not.
In Fenn v. Cedar Lumber & Hardware Co., 404 P.2d 966 (Utah 1965) the parties
owning land abutting either side of a street property were entitled to fee simple interest to
the center line of the street because the grantor who deeded the street property to the city
was also the grantor of the abutting landowners, and no intention to the contrary appeared
in any of the original deeds. That same lack of intention exists in the present matter.
Under the undisputed facts and the law of this case, there is no question but that A.O.
Smoot deeded to the center of the street.
In the present circumstances, the city only acquired public highway easement to
the roadway. In Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that based upon continuous use by the general
public for a period of greater than 10 years, the roadway leading to a residence was
impliedly dedicated to public as a public highway. The Kohler court also referred to §
27-12-89 of the Utah Code, which states:
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A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been continually used as a public thoroughfare
for a period often years.
At the time of the initial transfer at issue in this matter, law was well settled as to
the ownership of land bounded by a street. "On the sale of a lot bounded by a street, the
boundary is the middle of the street, unless otherwise stated expressly." Moody v.
Palmer, 50 Cal. 31 (1886); Helmurage v. Castle, 119 111. 664 (111. 1884); Cox v.
Louisville, 48 Ind. 178 (1874); City of Boston v. Richardson, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) (146
Mass. 1866); In Re Reid, 13 N.H. 381 (N.H. 1843); Paul v. Carver, 26 Pa. St. (2) (Casey)
223 (Pa. 1856); Morrow v. Willard, 30 Vt. 118 (Vt. 1857); Kimball v. City of Kenosha, 4
Wis. 321 (Wis. 1855). "If the language of the deed describing land conveyed, bounded
by a highway, leaves it doubtful whether the granter intended the line to be the center or
on the side of the highway, the boundary will be construed to be in the center of the
road." Champlin v. Pendleton, 13 Conn. 23 (Conn. 1838); Marsh v. Burk, (Vt. 1861).
The common law has been adopted in Utah, so far as it is not in conflict with the
Constitution or law of the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1(1953, as amended).
Utah codified this common law doctrine in CLU § 2017. § 7 (as amended 1888), which
stated:
A transfer of land bounded by a highway, passes the title of the person
whose estate has transferred, to the center of the highway.
A succession of laws passed in the Utah Legislature continue to this day. "The provision
of any statute, so far as they are the same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed
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as a continuation of such provisions and not as a new enactment." Utah Code Ann. § 683-6 (1953, as amended). The revised statute of Utah, 1898, contained in almost identical
statutory provision to the 1888 code, and provided:
A transfer of land bounded by a highway passes the title of the person
whose estate is transferred, to the center of the highway.
C.L. § 2071, R.S. of Utah 1898 § 1120.
The statute as revised in 1933 is even more specific to the case in point. That
statute expressly addresses land used as a public road. The Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, provide:
36-1-7. Public acquires only easement - by an abutting owner.
By taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquires only the right
of way in incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of
land bounded by a highway passes the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway.
The annotation to this statute notes that Utah's law is merely a codification of the
common law that a deed for land bounded by a public highway runs to the middle of that
road. It states:
The provisions of this section providing that the transfer of land bounded by
a highway passes title to the middle of the highway is merely declaratory of
the common law and has no application to the creation of a private
easement as distinguished from a public easement.
Brown v. O.S.L.Rv. Co.. 36 Utah 257, 102 P.740 (1909).
The present Utah Code provides:
A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right of way for which the
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public has only an easement passes, the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (1953, as amended 1991). Accordingly, Utah law has
always provided and remains consistent that land bounded by a street when a transfer is
made passes title to the center of the street. The properties in the present appeal are
bounded by property which used to be a street.
As this court ruled in Nelson, the parties do not dispute "that the metes and bounds
of each subsequent conveyance ran to the Roadway but did not specifically exclude it."
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35-36. Accordingly, when A.O. Smoot originally deeded the
property to plaintiffs predecessors in interest, on both the north and south boundaries of
Roadway, the grants ran to the middle of the Roadway by operation of law. Therefore,
the trial court erred when it ruled that the title to the property should be quieted in Provo
City.
III. UPON VACATION OR ABANDONMENT OF THE STREET, THE FEE
REVERTED TO THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS
In Nelson this court did not determine the exact interest which Provo City held
when 900 South was moved. This court only held:
Here, we determine that whether City's interest was that of a determinable
fee or fee simple, the interest was held only in trust.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37, fn. 2. Within the City's role as trustee, the City could vacate or
abandon old 900 South when it determined that a better route for 900 South existed. The
City could not, however, change the legal consequence of this action, which was that the
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Roadway reverted to the abutting property owners. The City breached its fiduciary duties
when the City attempted to deed property which it did not own. After the decision to
move 900 South was reached and traffic was no longer upon old 900 South, the City as
trustee no longer had any interest in the Roadway.
The public only had an easement upon 900 South. Prior to the grant of 1871 all
parties agree that 900 South already existed. All parties also agree that at the time of the
grant, when Utah was still a territory of the United States, the land upon which 900 South
was situated was owned by the United States. Thus, the public had but an easement to
travel thereupon. The grant in 1871 did not change this fundamental interest. A.O.
Smoot only transferred property to the abutting landowners; the city received no deed, nor
did the City reserve the Roadway. The underlying reversionary interest was granted to
the abutting landowners long before 1989. The City's interest, whether or not held in
trust, expired when old 900 South was no longer used as a roadway.
The trial court even recognized if all the City had was an easement, plaintiffs
theory upon which they maintained a right to a quiet title would prevail. The trial court
stated: "The Court believes that Plaintiffs' argument would have merit if the City and the
collective occupants of the city of Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use
the road." (R. 238). With the correct law applied, including this court's determinations
in Nelson, plaintiffs' position must prevail. Title must be quieted in the plaintiffs.
Many of the principles upon which the above stated conclusions are based are
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already the law of this case. Further, a review of this court's decision in F alula Farms,
Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993)1 illustrates many of these principles. In
Falula Farms this court was faced with a quiet title action where a party who owned
property abutting a roadway wished to develop that property. However, in order to
develop the property, the party wanted to move the roadway further onto its property. An
exchange occurred where the party deeded the land to the county for the new road and the
county in turn deeded the old roadway to the developer party. Essentially, this is exactly
what happened in the present matter; Provo City moved the Roadway to the South and
attempted to deed what had been the Roadway to another third party.
In Falula Farms this court held that the county's attempted conveyance was void
and this court further quieted title in one-half of the roadway to the abutting landowner.
This court explained:
Common law principles regarding highways, roads, and public rights-ofway prescribe that the public obtains only an easement in a highway or road
dedicated for public use. [Citation omitted] Furthermore, at common law
the owner of land which abutted a highway owned up to the middle of the
highway. [Citation omitted] Thus, common law principles gave the public,
represented by local government, no more than an easement in land
dedicated as a public highway or road. Consequently, when a city or
county abandoned or vacated a dedicated highway or road, the
abutting landowners owned and possessed the underlying property to
the middle of the highway or road.
Id. at 571 (emphasis added). In Falula Farms, this court held:

!

This case was previously briefed in Nelson prior to this court rendering the decision in
Falula Farms (December 2, 1993).
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[T]he County lost that [defeasible fee] in 1969 when it vacated part of the
roadway by moving it twenty-two feet to the west. Consequently, the fee
simple title to the vacated strip of land reverted to [the abutting landowner].
. . . From that point on, [the abutting landowner] held the fee simple
absolute title and enjoyed the exclusive right to use and control the twentytwo foot strip of land.
Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
In this case, Provo City has de facto vacated, or more clearly abandoned old 900
South. Provo City even argued to the trial court that old 900 South had been de facto
vacated. Provo City argued "there has been a de facto vacation of the street[.]" (R. 166).
Accordingly, the plaintiffs as abutting landowners own and should possess the underlying
property. Therefore, this court must remand this matter to the trial court with instructions
to quiet title in the plaintiffs.
This conclusion is further supported by the landmark decision of Sears v. Ogden
City. 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). In Sears, the Board of Education of Ogden obtained
two city blocks along 29th Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue. The
Board of Education requested that the street be vacated by Ogden City. The street was
vacated and conveyed by quit claim deed to the Board of Education. Plaintiffs, property
owners in the area, filed a Complaint to enjoin the closing of the street. Utah Supreme
Court stated:
This court has held that the interests a municipal body acquires in the streets
in a platted subdivision is a determinable fee. Upon vacation by the
governing authorities, the fee reverts to the abutting property owners.
Sears. 572 P.2d at 1359 (citing White v. Salt Lake Citv, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210
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(Utah 1952)). "Since the Board was the sole abutting property owner along the vacated
street, the fee interest would revert thereto without a deed from the city." Sears, 572 P.2d
at 1363. The court in Sears further analyzed the case by providing:
When the Board acquired the fee to the land abutting the street, there was a
presumption that the conveyance included the fee to the highway center line
subject to the public right of way (determinable fee).
Sears at 1369 N.9 (citing Fenton v. Cedar Lumber & Hardware Co.. 17 Utah 2d 99, 404
P.2d 966 (Utah 1965)).
Upon passage of the ordinance vacating the street, the city no longer had
any title or interest in the premises; and, therefore, the city had nothing to
sell or convey and the quit claim deed as a nullity as to any interest in the
roadway dedicated in Argonne Park Plat. Payne v. City of Larame, Wy.,
398 P.2d 557, 562 (Wyo. 1965).

When a street is vacated and the municipality does not own the underlying
fee, the municipality has no proprietary interest in the property and is not
entitled to compensation. Puget Sound Alumni of Campus Signa v. City of
Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 222, 422 P.2d 799 (Wash. 1967)[.]
Sears, at 1363.
This well established legal doctrine is completely on point. When Provo City no
longer used 900 South as a street and either impliedly vacated it or abandons its use, the
city no longer had any legal interest in the northern one-half of the street as it reverted to
the plaintiffs herein as the successors of the original grantees.
In the present circumstances, this court must continue to hold that there was no
clear intent to exclude the Roadway from the initial grant in this case, just as this court
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did in Nelson. See Nelson, 872 P.2d at 35-36. As the facts indicate, at the time the grants
were made to Plaintiffs predecessors, the road was already being used by the public. At
no time prior to the grants on both sides of the road did any person own the land which
makes up the Roadway.
The grant to Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest conveys the property with no
express reservation. The deed states that the property is conveyed to "James Dunn, his
heirs and assigns forever the foregoing described land with all rights, privileges and
appurtenances thereto belonging or in any way appertaining." By common law, the
appurtenances would include the interest up to the middle of the Roadway.
Both original deeds to the north and south parcels contain provisions including
"appurtenances" to the described land. An appurtenance is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary (5th ed.) as "that which belongs to something else; an adjunct; an appendage.
Something annexed to another thing more worthy as principle, and which passes as
incident to i t . . . see also appendant." Appendant is defined as " a thing annexed to or
belonging to another thing in passing with it. Something added or attached . . . "
The roadway between the Stubbs' addition and the First Ward Pasture was omitted
from all deeds. It was never claimed by Provo City pursuant to the Township Act. More
importantly, the city nor any other party every received an interest to the property by deed.
Thus, there was no intent of the parties to the conveyance which would indicate that they
meant to exclude the roadway. The conveyance of the real property at issue in this action
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is presumed to have passed title to the center of the roadway. When the city impliedly
vacated or abandoned the property, the public easement was extinguished and title to the
center of the roadway reverted to the plaintiffs.
IV.

THE CITY DID NOT HOLD A FEE INTEREST
This court held in Nelson:
Landowners claim that City could not acquire title to 900 South under the
patent unless Smoot reserved the street for public use by obtaining a deed.
We agree.
In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like any other
claimant would have to obtain a deed.
Here, the parties agree that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway or
obtained a deed to the Roadway.

Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37. In other words, the City never acquired title. As a result, the trial
court's ruling that "the fact that the City held title to the land on which the Roadway was
located (albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that the Roadway was not a road made
pursuant to the grant of easement which would carry with it a reversionary interest,"
cannot possibly be sustained.
Defendants have claimed that the property pursuant to the deed received from the
President of the United States pursuant to "an act of Congress for the release of
inhabitants of cities and towns upon the public lands." That act provided that the town
corporate authorities, or a county court judge, could enter the proper United States Land
Office and aquire the property at a minimum price. The property could then be deeded:
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In trust for the several use and benefit and use of the occupants thereof,
according to their respective interest; the execution of which trust, as to the
disposal of the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the sales thereof, are
to be conducted under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
the legislative authority of the state or territory in which the same may be
situated.
An Act of Congress for the Relief of the Inhabitants of the Cities and Towns Upon Public
Lands. March 2, 1867.
The rules and regulations prescribed by the legislative authority or territory are
apparently codified in Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-1 et sec. The Township Acts as provisions
for land reserved for public use.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-17 and all predecessor versions of the statute provide:
Reservation of land for public uses.
Lots or parcels of land necessary for streets, public squares . . . or public
use, may be reserved by the city commissioners, the mayor, the president of
the board of trustees, or the district judge, as the case may be; and he may
execute and deliver to the proper party a deed for any property set aside for
such purpose.
Provo City did not reserve this street for public uses. More importantly, Provo City as
this court earlier recognized, failed to obtain a deed for the property either pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-17 or pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-8. Simply stated,
Defendants are not deeded owners of the land underlying the roadway.
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V.

THE INTEREST HELD BY PROVO CITY WAS AN EASEMENT OR A
DETERMINABLE FEE
At the time of the original conveyances, a fee simple estate and right in lands could

only be taken for public use when: (1) the property was taken for public buildings or
grounds, or (2) for permanent buildings, or (3) for reservoirs and dams, and permanent
flooding occasioned thereby, or (4) for an outlet for a flow, or place for the deposit of
debris or tailing of a mine. Common Laws of Utah § 1106.1 (1884). As a result, Provo
City could not have obtained an absolute interest in the Roadway.
Although the Court of Appeals in Nelson held that Provo City did not have a fee
simple absolute interest in the property, the trial court nonetheless held that such interest
existed. However, the statutory laws in effect at the time of the grant precluded a
municipality from owning the property in fee simple absolute. This legal conclusion
leads to the result in this matter. First, since the municipality could not hold fee simple,
the trial court below must as a matter of law be in error in claiming thait the city could
hold fee simple. Second, the fact that the statutory laws would not allow a municipality to
hold property in fee simple title leads to the only conclusion that the original conveyance
to the plaintiffs' predecessors was intended to convey to the center of the road.
The Utah Supreme Court in construing the predecessor statute of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-5-4, stated as follows:
While the word "fee" is used in this section, it is clear from what follows
that it is not intended that the fee of the corpus or land itself should pass,
but only the fee to the service, and this only for public use for all purposes
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of a street or highway. The fee mentioned in the statute was thus what is
known as limited or determinable fee, and was created for a special purpose
or purposes only, and hence was subject of abandonment. Sowadski v. Salt
Lake County. 36 Utah 127, 104 P.2d 111,116.
The City of Provo has clearly demonstrated the intent and desire to abandon old 900
South. Provo City (1) moved 900 South, (2) discontinued any public use of the property,
(3) attempted to vacate the property by city ordinance, and (4) attempted to deed the
property to a third party.
Moreover, once a public highway has been established pursuant to § 27-12-89, it
remains a public highway unless expressly abandoned by the proper authorities. In the
present circumstances, an express abandonment has occurred. Provo City has attempted
to deed this property to a third party who has no connection with the city. Provo City
attempted to vacate the street, upon which vacation the property would have reverted to
the abutting landowners, further evidencing their clear intent to abandon the property. In
fact, abandonment took place when the roadway was rerouted by the city.
In Brown v. Oregon Short Liner Railroad Co., 102 P. 740, 742 (Utah 1909), the
court held:
An easement may be extinguished by an act of the owner of the easement
which is incompatible with the existence of the right claim. If the owner of
the easement himself obstructs it in a manner inconsistent with its further
enjoinment, or permits the owner of a subservient estate to do so, the
easement will be considered abandoned.
In the present circumstances, not only has Provo moved the road so that it no longer
remains on the property, but Provo City has taken the further step of deeding the property
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to a developer where now a Taco Bell restaurant sits. A more clear example of
abandonment could not exist.
The Supreme Court recognized this expressly in White v. Salt Lake City. 239 P.2d
210 (Utah 1952), wherein the court adopted Sowadski and provided:
If the governing authorities are satisfied that neither the public interest nor
any person will be materially injured, a petition to vacate shall be granted.
In such event the "limited and determinable fee" spoken of in the Sowadski
case would then revert to the abutting property owner.
White at 213. The court in White went on to state:
If the street should cease to serve any public interest, it may be abandoned,
and, in that case, the right to the use and control of the roadway would
revert to the abutting owning pursuant to 36-1-7 and common law
principles.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the Federal Townsite Act in Hall v. North
Ogden City, 175 P.2d 703 (Utah 1946). HaU addresses and lays forth the history, purpose
and intent of the Townsite Act of 1867. At the time of this Townsite Act it was felt that
the ownership of land fell into two categories, those being of equitable ownership and
bare legal title. The Hall court recognized that equitable ownership of Ihe land was held
by the inhabitants, whereas bare legal title to the land was held by the United States of
America. The purpose of the Act was to merge bare legal title with equitable title in the
inhabitants in order to create fee simple absolute title to the occupants of the land. The
statute was never intended to be construed as the trial court did below that the Townsite
act would merge the title in the city or municipality.
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The Federal Townsite Act provided in pertinent part that the land could be
conveyed by the United States of America to a trustee:
. . . for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to
their respective interest; the execution of which trust... to be conducted
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative
authority of the state or territory in which the same may be situated . . . and
provided, further that any act of said treaties, not made in conformity to the
rules and regulations herein eluded to shall be void[.]
Hall v. North Qgden City, 175 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1946). Provo City's attempt to sell
property to which they did not have title was a void act. As soon as the property was
abandoned, Provo City no longer had any interest in the property. As trustee, the City had
exercised all possible control over the property when the original land grant occurred over
100 years ago. When A.O. Smoot failed to reserve the property and obtain a deed, the
possible actions of the municipality as trustee were limited. Provo City's current attempt
to change the legal consequence of its actions constitutes a breach of its fiduciary duties.
The trial court should have ruled on remand that Provo City's only possible course of
action was to aquiese in title being quieted in plaintiffs.
VI.

TITLE IN PROVO CITY WOULD BE VOID UNDER THE TOWNSITE
ACT
The patent from the U.S. government to A.O. Smoot, in trust, conveyed only bare

legal title to the land. At the time the trust was created, the occupants were the
beneficiaries under the trust and also were the equitable owners of the land being
occupied. The trustee had the duty to convey legal title to the occupants of the land in
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order to merge legal title and equitable title. Conveyance by the trustee of bare legal title
to the person not occupying the land constitutes a breach of a trust and the conveyance is
void. Hail, 175 P.2dat 709.
In the present circumstances, the court has been confused about the status of the
land whereupon 900 South used to exist. After A.O. Smoot conveyed the property to
those abutting property owners, there was nothing left to convey. All that was left was
the adjoining property owners now having fee simple absolute, and a determinable fee
existing in the street.
Since the road 900 South abutted the property of Plaintiffs' predecessors, actual
title in the roadway was in Dunn on the north and in the First Ward Pasture Company on
the south. Provo City never fulfilled any requirements to hold any title in the roadway.
Provo City has now abandoned its claim to the road and currently has no underlying
interest. Any claim that Provo City received its interest by and through A.O. Smoot is
therefore void as provided in the Federal Townsite Act.
Finally, it should be noted that there are substantial similarities between Hall v.
North Ogden City and the present case. In Hall, plaintiffs obtained property under the
Townsite Act which was platted with streets and highways. The streets and highways
were never opened. North Ogden City then sought to claim ownership of the streets
pursuant to the plats and federal land grant. In Hall the Utah Supreme Court held that the
streets had been abandoned and ownership reverted to the Halls who owned equitable title
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to the property.
Likewise, in the present case Provo City claims ownership of the city street which
has been vacated and/or abandoned. Provo City does not own the underlying title. As in
Hall, the interest in the property should revert to the abutting landowners, the plaintiffs
herein.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court must reverse and remand the trial court's
holding and title must be quieted in the plaintiffs.
DATED AND SIGNED this

[U^

day of November, 1999.

DAVID N. MORTENSEN
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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last day shall fall on a Sunday, Christmas day, or on any day appointed
by the President of the United States as a day of public fast or thanksgiving, or on the Fourth of July, in which case the time shall be reckoned
exclusive of that day also.
SEC. 49. And be it further enacted, That all the jurisdiction, power, Jurisdiction of
and authority conferred upon and vested in the District Court of the United States
United States by this act in cases in bankruptcy are hereby conferred f ^ c t ^ f Coupon and vested in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and Jnmbia and Terin and upon the supreme courts of the several Territories of the United n tones.
States, when the bankrupt resides in the said District of Columbia or in
either of the said Territories. And in those judicial districts which are j n districts not
not within any organized circuit of the United States, the power and in organized cirjurisdiction of a circuit court in bankruptcy may be exercised by the eSercwe^wer
district judge.
of circuit court.
SEC. 50. And be it further enacted, That this act shall commence and When act to
take effect as to the appointment of the officers created hereby, and the toke effecL
promulgation of rules and general orders, from and after the date of its
approval: Pi-ovided, That no petition or other proceeding under this act Proviso,
shall be filed, received, or commenced before the first day of June, anno
Domini, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven.
APPROVED, March 2, 1867.
CHAP. CLXXVIL — An Act for the Relief of the Inhabitants of Cities and Totcns March 2,1867.'
upon the Public Lands.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever any portion of . ^T 11 an^hori'
the public lands of the United States have been or shall be settled upon enter public
and occupied as a town site, and therefore not subject to entry under the lands occupied
agricultural pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful, in case such town shall "intraum price'
be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof, and if not incorpor- in trust, &c.
ated, for the judge of the county court for the county in which such town
may be situated, to enter at the proper land office, and at the minimum
price, the land so settled and occupied, in trust for the several use and
benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective interests;
the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, Trust, how
and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such rules executed,
and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the
State or Territory in which the same may be situated: Provided, That
the entry of the land intended by this act to be made shall be made, or a Entry, &c.
declaratory statement of the purpose of the inhabitants to enter it as a whentobe
town site under this act shall be filed with the register of the proper land
'
office, prior to the commencement of the public sale of the body of land
in which it is included, and that the entry or declaratory statement shall *° include
include only such lands as is actually occupied by the town and the title
'
to which is in the United States. If upon surveyed lands the entry shall upon surin its exterior limit be made in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the ^i^o^fa^l
public lands authorized by the act of twenty-fourth April, one thousand Vol. iii. p. 666
eight hundred and twenty ; and where the inhabitants are in number one
hundred and less than two hundred, shall embrace not exceeding three
hundred and twenty acres; and in cases where the inhabitants of such Amount of
town are more than two hundred and less than one thousand, shall em- 1&nd tthj£dma3r
brace not exceeding six hundred and forty acres; and where the number
of inhabitants is one thousand and over one thousand, shall embrace not
exceediug twelve hundred and eighty acres: Provided^ That for each ad- Proviso,
ditional one thousand inhabitants, not exceeding five thousand in ail, a
further grant of three hundred and twenty acres shall be allowed: And Where tnere
provided fuHher, That in any Territory in which a land office may not [ ^ " 1 ° ^
have been established, declaratory statements as hereinbefore providedfiledwhere.
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CH. 177, 178, 179.

1867.

may be filed with the surveyor-general of the surveying district in which
the lands are situate, who shall transmit said declaratory statement to the
Certain acts general land office: And provided, further, That any act of said trusof ^trustees to be t e e s n o t m a ( j e -lQ con f 0 rmity to the rules and regulations herein alluded to
Regulations, shall be void ; effect to be given to the foregoing provisions accordlug to
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior:
This act not And provided further. That the provisions of this act shall not apply to
to apply to cer- m ilitarr or other reservations heretofore made by the United State>, nor
tain reserva-

*

.

,

tions;

to reservations for lighthouses, custom-houses, mints, or such other public
purposes as the interests of the United States may require, whether held
under reservations through the land office by title derived from the Crown
nor to mines of Spain, or otherwise: And provided further, That no title shall be acof /told, &c.
quired, under the provisions of this act, to any mine of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper.
APPROVED, March 2, 1867.
March 2, 1867. CHAP. CLXXVIIL — An Act allowing the Duties on foreign Merchandise imported
into the Port of Albany to be secured and paid at that Place.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
Albany, New States of America in Congress assembled, That Albany, in the State of
port of delivery. New York, and within the collection district of New York, b<2, and is
hereby, declared to be a port of delivery within the aforesaid district; and
Surveyor.
there shall be appointed a surveyor of customs, to reside at Baid port, who
shall, in addition to the customary duties performed by that officer in
1831, ch. 87. other places, perform the duties prescribed in an act entitled "An act alO.IT. p. 4 . j o w j n g ( h e fore,*gn merchandise imported into Pittsburg, Wheeling, Cincinnati, Louisville, Saint Louis, Nashville, and Natchez, to be secured
and paid at those places," approved March two, eighteen hundred and
Bond,fees,and thirty-one. ' The said surveyor, before taking the oath of office, shall give
*'
security to the United States for the faithful performance of his duties in
the sum of ten thousand dollars, and shall receive, in addition to the customary fees and emoluments of his office, an annual salary of six hundred
dollars.
Privileges and SEC. 2* And be it further enacted, That the same privileges granted to
^wble.008 E?" t h e P o r t s o f d e l i v e i 7 mentioned in the first section of this act. and the
restrictions created by the said act, are hereby extended and made applicable to all goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United
States at any port of entry and destined to said port of Albany.
Privileges of
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted,, That the Secretary of the Treasury
7 and he is hereby,
J
I^^fL^ll'
ft*L
shall
he,
extended to in is
; authorized
. ,
» toJ extend
J
• the
» / privileges
• • • ! • »of
# the
»
port.
warehouse acts of August six, eighteen hundred and forty-six, and Marco
184«, ch. 84. twenty-eight, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, and the regulations of th€
1854,lcii.P30.3' Treasury Department relating thereto, to the said port of Albany.
Vol. x. p. 270.

APPROVED, March 2,1867.

March 2,1867. CHAP. CLXXIX. — An Act to create the Office of Surveyor-General in the Territory c
Montana, and establish a Land Office in the Territories of Montana and Arizona.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Unit*
Snrveyor-gen- States of America in Congress assembled, That the President, by the ad
or ontana. ^ . ^ a n £ c o n g e n t 0 f t h e Senate, shall be, and he is hereby, authorized t
Salary and du-appoint a surveyor-general for Montana, whose annual salary shall b
tics
three thousand dollars, and whose power, authority, and duties shall b
the same as those provided by law for the surveyor-general of Oregoi
office rented ^ e BDa ^ D f t v e P r 0 P e r allowances for clerk hire, office rent and fuel, whi
fuel.
'
b now allowed by law to the surveyor-general of Oregon.
Montana and
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the public lands within tl
o^stoicueatab- Territories of Montana and Arizona, to which the Indian title is or sha
lisbed.
be extinguished, shall each respectively constitute a new land district
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REAL ESTATE

another, may remove such improvements without injury otherwise to such real
estate, at any time before he is evicted therefrom, or he may claim and have the
benefit of this chapter by proceeding as herein directed.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2028;
C.L. 1917, § 5038; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 786-8.

CHAPTER 7
TOWNSITES
Section
57-7-1.
57-7-2.
57-7-3.
57-7-4.
57-7-5.
57-7-6.
57-7-7.
57-7-8.
57-7-9.
57-7-10.
57-7-11.

Disposition of lots to persons entitled after entry.
Notice of entry.
Claims to lots to be filed — Time
and place.
Adverse claims — Determination.
Proof of claims when no adverse
claim advanced.
Conveyance and deed to proper
claimant.
When judge is claimant of lands.
When city or town officer is claimant of lands.
Change of venue.
Statement of expenses.
Payment to be made before conveyance.

Section
57-7-12.

57-7-13.
57-7-14.

57-7-15.
57-7-16.
57-7-17.
57-7-18.
57-7-19.

Full payment to be made within
six months — Lien for nonpayment — Sale to satisfy.
Errors in measurement or computation.
Death of officer — Authority to
complete trust vests in successor.
Disposition of unclaimed lands.
Sale of unclaimed lands.
Reservation of lands for public
uses.
Disposition of proceeds of sales.
Possession for ten years entitles
claimant to conveyance.

57-7-1. Disposition of lots to persons entitled after entry.
When the corporate authorities of any city or town, or the district judge of
any county in which any city or town may be situated, shall have entered at the
proper land office the land or any part of the land settled and occupied as the
site of such city or town pursuant to and by virtue of the provisions of the Act
of Congress entitled "An act for the relief of the inhabitants of cities and towns
upon the public lands," approved March 2, 1867, and acts amendatory thereof
and supplementary thereto, it shall be the duty of such corporate authorities
or judge, as the case may be, to dispose of and convey the title to such land, or
to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares thereof, to the persons entitled
thereto, who shall be ascertained as hereinafter prescribed.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2071;
C.L. 1917, § 6121; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 940-1.

Federal Law. — The federal act referred to
in this section is the Tbwnsite Act of 1867,
which does not appear in U.S.C.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of entry.
—Trust for benefit of occupants.
Entry by mayor.

Effect of entry.
—Trust for benefit of o c c u p a n t s .
The corporate authorities or judge who enters the lands as provided by this section holds
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HIGHWAYS

state to so do. All moneys received for such leases and rentals, after
deducting any portion to which the federal government may be entitled,
shall be deposited with the state treasurer and credited to the state road
fund.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 100.

27-12-101. Title to property acquired by state. Title to real property
acquired by the State Road Commission or the counties, cities and towns,
either by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise,
for highway rights-of-way or other highway purposes, may be in fee simple
or any lesser estate or interest. A transfer of land bounded by a public
highway on a right-of-way for which the public has only an easement
passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle
of the highway.
Title and right of public and abutting
owners.
Erection of electric power lines on public
highway right-of-way, the fee to which is not
in the public but in the owner of the abutting
property, is within the purview of the easement for highway purposes and is not an
additional servitude for which the abutting
owner is entitled to compensation. Pickett v.
California Pac. Utilities (1980) 619 P 2d 325.

History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 101.
Cross-References.
Fee vested by dedication of streets by plat,
57-5-4.
Public vacation of street property.
Where city vacated street property which
was never used by the public and never
platted as a street on the official records, the
parties owning the land abutting on either
side of such property were entitled to fee
simple interests to the center line of the
"street," where the grantor who deeded the
street property to the city was also the
grantor of the abutting landowners, and no
intention to the contrary appeared in any of
the original deeds. Fenton v. Cedar Lbr. &
Hardware Co. (1965) 17 U 2d 99, 404 P 2d 966.

Collateral References.
Highways <£= 80.
39A CJS Highways § 136.
39 AmJur 2d 531, Highways, Streets, and
Bridges § 158.
Description with reference to highway as
carrying title to center or side of highway, 49
ALR 2d 982.
Property rights of abutting owners in trees
cut or removed from street or highway, 9
ALR 1269.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction and application.
Repealed section providing that public, by
taking or accepting land for highway,
acquired only the right-of-way and incidents
necessary to enjoying and maintaining it was
merely declaratory of the common law, and
had no application to creation of private as
distinguished from public easement. Brown v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co. (1909) 36 U 257, 102
P 740, 24 LRA (NS) 86.
Title and right of public and abutting
owners.
City still owned fee to strip, acquired
under Townsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq.),
after alleged dedication thereof as public

54

street, so that only right that public could
have acquired would be right to easement
across strip for traveling purposes, and only
additional right contiguous property owners
might acquire would be right of ingress to
and egress from their property. Premium Oil
Co. v. Cedar City (1947) 112 U 324, 187 P 2d
199.
Statutes regulating water mains in relation to highways clearly indicated that legislature did not regard dedication of a street
in a platted subdivision as the surrender of
an easement with retention of the fee in the
abutting owner. White v. Salt Lake City
(1952) 121 U 134, 239 P 2d 210.

APPENDIX B

Cite as 872 P.2d 35 (UtahApp. 1994)

Boyd NELSON, Lorraine Nelson, Steven
Whitlock, and Sheila Whitlock,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 930227-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 23, 1994.

Following city's purported vacation of
roadway, abutting landowners brought suit
seeking to establish their reversionary interests to middle of road. City counterclaimed
for quiet title to roadway. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif,
J., entered final judgment awarding legal and
equitable title of roadway to city, and abutting landowners appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: (1) city did not
acquire fee simple title to dedicated roadway
by virtue of Federal Townsite Act, but held
roadway only in trust, with corresponding
fiduciary duties to collective occupants of
city, and (2) city did not properly vacate
roadway, even assuming that it could do so in
its capacity as trustee.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Dedication <2>53
City did not acquire fee simple title to
dedicated roadway by virtue of Federal
Townsite Act, and could not acquire such
title unless it reserved roadway for public
use by obtaining a deed; until such time, city
held roadway in trust only, with corresponding fiduciary duties to occupants of town.
U.C.A.1953, 57-7-3, 57-7-17; 43 U.S.C.(1970
Ed.) § 718.
2. Municipal Corporations <£*657(7)
Even assuming that city could properly
vacate roadway which it held only in trust for
occupants of city, any interest that city held
after vacating roadway would still be held in
trust, and not in absolute ownership.

3. Municipal Corporations <3>657(7)
When municipality has but a determinable fee and does not own underlying fee
simple to roadway, vacation of roadway results in fee reverting to abutting landowners.
4. Municipal Corporations 0657(7)
When municipality owns underlying fee
to roadway, proper vacation of roadway
would not change municipality's right to underlying fee.
5. Municipal Corporations 0657(5)
Roadway was not properly vacated,
where city failed to notify abutting landowners, or to notify its citizens generally pursuant to statute until after purported vacation.
U.C.A.1953, 10-8-8.4.

James G. Clark (argued), Provo, for appellants.
Gary Gregerson, Provo City Atty., and
David Dixon, Asst. City Atty. (argued), Provo, for appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIS,
JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
Appellants (Landowners) appeal a final
judgment concluding that appellee Provo
City (City) holds legal and equitable title (fee
simple) to the portion of 900 South between
100 East and University Avenue (Roadway)
abutting Landowners' property. We reverse
and remand.
Pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of
1869, the federal government deeded the
Roadway along with the abutting lands in
trust to the local municipal authority, Provo
Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee (the
Townsite Conveyance). The Roadway existed as a public thoroughfare prior to this
conveyance. The parties do not dispute that
Landowners' predecessors in interest did not
occupy the Roadway or the abutting property at the time of the Townsite Conveyance.
Nor do they dispute that the metes and
bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to

36 Utah

872 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

the Roadway but did not specifically exclude
it.
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the
Roadway to James Dunn, who in 1876 deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a
portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to
appellants Stephen Whitlock and Sheila
Whitlock. In 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone
received another portion of the Stubbs parcel. Finally, in 1991, appellants Boyd Nelson
and Lorraine Nelson received a deed for
another portion of the Stubbs parcel.
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the
Roadway to John P.R. Johnson, as trustee of
the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927,
First Ward Pasture Company deeded its parcel to City. 900 South continued to be used
as a public roadway.
In its regularly scheduled meeting of August 22, 1989, the Provo Municipal Council
passed ordinance number 0-89-055, which
purported to vacate and set aside the Roadway. After passing the ordinance, City published notice one time in the Provo Daily
Herald on August 31, 1989. City mailed no
notice of the vacation to the abutting landowners either before or after the fact. City
then rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the
property it owned to the south of the original
route and sold the vacated portion of the
original route to a commercial developer.
The vacation of the Roadway landlocked one
lot and deprived two other lots of access to
900 South.
Landowners sued City claiming a reversionary interest in the Roadway from their
property lines to the middle of the Roadwray.
They sought compensation and, in the alternative, the setting aside of the vacation.
City counterclaimed for quiet title to the
Roadway.
On July 6, 1992, the trial court quieted title
in City as against Landowners, concluding
that City held fee simple title since the time
of the Townsite Conveyance. Landowners
moved for specific findings regarding City's
compliance with the Townsite Act and with
the State Township Act. The trial court

CITY'S INTEREST IN ROADWAY
Landowners claim the court erred in concluding the Townsite Conveyance conveyed a
fee simple interest to City because (1) the
patent, when read in context of the Townsite
Act, conveyed the Roadway to City in trust
only, and (2) City failed to reserve the Roadway for public use pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 57-7-8 or -17 (1990).
United States Patent
[1] In 1867, the United States Congress
passed the Townsite Act, also known as "An
Act of Congress for the Relief of the Inhabitants of the Cities and Towns upon Public
Lands." Federal Townsite Act, ch. 177, 14
Stat. 541 (1867), codified as 43 U.S.C. § 718,
repealed by P.L. 94-579, Title VII, § 703(a),
90 Stat. 2789 (1973). This act enabled town
corporate authorities, as trustees, to acquire
federally-owned property for their towns.
The property was acquired
in trust for the several use and benefit and
use of the occupants thereof, according to
their respective interests; the execution of
which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in
such town, and the proceeds of the sales
thereof, to be conducted under such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by
the legislative authority of the State or
Territory in which the same may be situated.
Id.
The Townsite Act limited townsite lands to
those "actually occupied by the town and the
title to which is in the United States." Id.
The Townsite Act provided that the local
legislative authority could make regulations
for the disposition of the townsite lands. Id.
However, "any act of said trustees not made
in conformity to the rules and regulations
herein alluded to shall be void." Id. See
Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 325, 175
P.2d 703, 705 (1946).
Conveyances pursuant to the Townsite Act
transferred title to town authorities in trust
for the collective occupants: Conversely,
town authorities could not hold the land as
purchasers.1
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the
TWnm'tp Act to mean that conveyances
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thereunder served to transfer equitable ownership of a parcel of land to an occupant only
if the parcel was occupied at the time of
transfer. Hall, 175 P.2d at 705. Hall does
not address the issue before us: whether a
municipality has fee simple to a dedicated
roadway where the abutting land was unoccupied at the time the town acquired it.2
Still, the language of the Townsite Act is
clear that conveyances thereunder served to
transfer land in trust to the municipality as
trustee and not as absolute owner.
Disposing Legislation
Landowners claim that City could not acquire title to 900 South under the patent
unless Smoot reserved the street for public
use by obtaining a deed. We agree.
The Townsite Act provided that the local
legislative authority could make regulations
for the disposition of the townsite lands and
"any act of said trustees not made in conformity to the rules and regulations herein
alluded to shall be void." 43 U.S.C. § 718.
Utah's disposing legislation is found in Utah
Code Ann. § 57-7-1 to -19 (1990).
Section 57-7-17 of the current code, and
all predecessor statutes, provides as follows:
Lots or parcels of land necessary for
streets . . . may be reserved by the city
commissioners, the mayor, the president of
the board of trustees or the district judge,
as the case may be; and he [or she] may
authorities could not purchase the land, but must
hold it in trust for the collective occupants:
Mr. Howard: Does the Senator from California mean to be understood that this bill provides that the corporate authorities of the town
may become the purchasers? Is that the
scheme here?
Mr. Conness: No, sir.
Mr. Howard: I so understood him.
Mr. Conness: They simply enter the land as
agents in trust for the occupants, those in
possession.
Mr. Howard: Do they get a title?
Mr. Conness: A title for the occupants from
the United States.
Mr. Howard: Then they become the owners in
trust.
Mr. Conness: In trust. That is it exactly.
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1109
(1867).
2

- City cites Loeber v. Butte General Electric, 16
Mont. 1, 39 P. 912 (1895) for the proposition that
the municipality holds fee simple title as absolute

execute and deliver to the propef party a
deed for any property set aside for such
purposes.
Section 57-7-8 provides:
If a city commissioner or the mayor of
any city or the president of the board of
trustees of any town shall be a claimant of
lands in such city or town, the recorder or
the clerk thereof, as the case may be, shall,
upon the certificate of the district court
made as in the case of other claimants,
execute a deed of conveyance to such
claimant for the lands finally adjudged to
him [or her] by the court.
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the
stated disposing legislation, provide that a
townsite conveyance transferred land to a
municipality in trust. In order for the municipality to own the land for itself, it, like
any other claimant, would have to obtain a
deed.
Here, the parties agree that City never
explicitly reserved the Roadway or obtained
a deed to the Roadway pursuant to section
57-7-8 or -17. Thus, City remains holder of
the Roadway in trust. City purported to
vacate the Roadway as absolute owner, without regard to its responsibilities as trustee or
the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we
remand this matter to the trial court to
consider City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the
beneficiaries, in this case, the collective occupants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718.
owner to a street derived from a townsite conveyance. In Loeber, the disputed alley had been
included in the original townsite survey and the
abutting land had been occupied at the time of
the townsite transfer. The issue of whether the
municipality held the alley in fee simple or as a
determinable fee was not before the court. The
court held that because the alley in question had
been dedicated to public use before the conveyance of the lot, the abutting landowner "was not
the owner in fee of the alley" and thus the
abutting landowner could not complain of the
installation of electric poles in the alley. Id. 39
P. at 913. This holding is not helpful to resolution of this case because it does not resolve
whether the municipality held a determinable fee
or an absolute fee in the alley. The municipality
in Loeber needed only to have held a determinable fee or even an easement to permit installation of the electric poles.
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DETERMINABLE FEE
[2] Landowners claim the trial court
erred in failing to conclude that upon vacation of the Roadway, the fee to the center
line of the Roadway would revert to them as
abutting property owners.
[3,4] Utah case law relies on common
law to support the theory that where a municipality has but a determinable fee 3 and
does not own the underhing fee simple, the
vacating of the roadway results in the fee
reverting to the abutting landowners. Sears,
572 P.2d at 1363; White v. Salt Lake City,
121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952); Falula Farms, 866 P.2d at 571. See also Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-8.5 (Supp.1993) (vacating
of public roadway dedicated to public use by
proprietor terminates city's determinable fee
therein). Conversely, where a municipality
owns the underlying fee to a roadway, proper
vacation of such would not change the municipality's right to the underlying fee. Sears,
572 P.2d at 1363.
While City may hold the Roadway in fee
simple, that interest is held in trust. Thus,
even if City as trustee had (or could have)
properly vacated the Roadway, City's interest would still be held in trust and not in
absolute ownership. This brings us to
whether or not City properly vacated the
Roadway.
NOTICE TO VACATE
[5] Landowners claim City did not properly vacate the Roadway because it did not
provide proper statutory notice to abutting
landowners and City's other occupants.
A municipality may not vacate a street
unless it has provided proper notice pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8.4 (1992). Notice is given "by publishing in a newspaper
published or of general circulation in such
city once a week for four consecutive weeks
preceding action on such petition or intention
3.

A fee simple determinable expires automatically on the occurrence of a stated event. See
Black's Law Dictionary 615-16 (6th ed. 1990).
Thus, where a municipality has a determinable
fee in a roadway, common law provides that the
limited fee ends when the roadway is vacated.
See Falula Farms v. Ludlow. 866 P.2d 569. 571

. . . and by mailing such notice to all owners
of record of land abutting the street or alley
proposed to be vacated
" Id. See also
Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah
1974) (purported vacation of roadway nullity
where no notice given to abutting landowners
or general public); Boskovich v. Midvale
City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435, 437
(1952) (improper vacation of street and alley
denied abutting landowners due process);
Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116
P.2d 406, 407, 410 (Utah 1941) (mayor could
not quitclaim alley by resolution to abutting
land owner in contravention of vacation statute even where land had been deeded to city
by federal government).
Here, City did not notify abutting landowners, nor did it notify its citizens generally
pursuant to statute. In fact, the single published notice ran after the purported vacation. Thus, City's notice was not only insufficient, it was untimely. As a result, any
purported vacation of the Roadway is a nullity. See Boskovich, 243 P.2d at 437. We
therefore reverse the court's conclusion that
City properly vacated the Roadway and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
CONCLUSION
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in trust only; (2)
hold that City never explicitly reserved the
Roadway or obtained a deed to the Roadway
pursuant to statute; (3) remand for consideration of City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the
beneficiaries; and (4) reverse the court's determination that City properly vacated the
Roadway.
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

municipality typically obtains a determinable fee
in roadways when the same are accepted thereby
pursuant to the final approval of a subdivision
plat. That was the case in Sears v. Ogden, 572
P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1977). Here, we determine that whether City's interest was that of a
determinable fee or a fee simole. the interest was

Cite as 866 P.2d 569 (UtahApp. 1993)

inspections. Inspector Malencik testified
that, in his opinion, there were several additional steps Hidden Valley could have taken
to minimize erosion, but did not identify any
specific steps that Hidden Valley had apparently failed to take during that eighteen-day
period. The Board made no findings with
respect to Hidden Valley's alleged failure to
Aunimize erosion, and there was no evidence
presented that would have supported such a
finding. In light of the absence of evidence,
the Board could not have found that Hidden
Valley had, between November 1 and November 19, failed to take all reasonable steps
to minimize erosion. We therefore conclude
that the Board erred in upholding this portion of the NOV.
Failure to Seed and Revegetate
Disturbed Areas
The Board found that Hidden Valley
"failed to comply with the Permanent Program standards and the approved Reclamation Plan by having failed to seed the disturbed area constituting the outslopes of the
access road." Based on this finding, the
Board upheld that portion of the Division's
NOV that cited Hidden Valley for failing to
seed and revegetate disturbed areas.
There is some dispute in the record as to
whether Hidden Valley failed to seed and
revegetate the disturbed areas. However,
the Division did not introduce any evidence
that Hidden Valley had failed to meet seeding and revegetating requirements between
November 1 and November 19. Consequently, the Division has not supported this portion of the NOV with substantial evidence on
the record. The Division has not established
a prima facie showing that Hidden Valley
had, between November 1 and November 19,
failed to seed and revegetate all disturbed
areas at the mine site. In light of the lack of
record evidence supporting the Division's position, the Board's decision to uphold this
portion of the NOV was arbitrary and capricious. We therefore conclude that the Board
erred in upholding this portion of the NOV.

violations charged in the NOV. We therefore reverse the Board's decision upholding
the Division's issuance of the NOV and vacate the Division's penalty assessment
against Hidden Valley.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
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FALULA FARMS, INC., Plaintiff
and Appellee,

Bonnie B. LUDLOW, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 930050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 2, 1993.

Grantee of deed from county purporting
to convey fee title in vacated county highway
brought quiet title action against abutting
landowner. The First District Court, Rich
County, Clint S. Judkins, J., entered judgment quieting title in grantee. Abutting
landowner appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) county obtained
defeasible fee simple title in roadway dedicated as part of subdivision map, but (2)
county lost its fee interest by vacating part of
roadway.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Quieting Title <§>1
Quiet title action involves ultimate conclusion of law as to who owns disputed piece
of property.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(2)

CONCLUSION
The Division failed to establish a prima
facie showing of the facts underlying the

In reviewing trial court's conclusions of
law, appellate court accords it no particular
deference, but reviews it for correctness.
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3. Dedication <3=>53
County obtained fee interest in strip of
land dedicated for county road in subdivision
plan which was filed and recorded. U.CA
1953, 57-5-4 (Repealed).
4. Dedication <5=>64, 65
County lost its defeasible fee simple title
in roadway dedicated in subdivision map by
moving and vacating part of roadway and,
thus, abutting property owner succeeded to
fee simple title in vacated land. U.CA1953,
27-12-102.5.
Randy S. Ludlow, argued, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
George W. Preston, argued, Logan, for
plaintiff and appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, ORME and
RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff Falula Farms, Inc. (Falula Farms)
brought this quiet title action to resolve ownership in a strip of land that was previously a
county highway on the shores of Bear Lake.
The trial court quieted title in Falula Farms
and defendant Bonnie Ludlow (Mrs. Ludlow)
appeals. We reverse and remand for the
entry of judgment quieting title to the vacated strip of land in Mrs. Ludlow.
FACTS
In 1958, Alden and Delia Siddoway began
developing a portion of their lakefront property on Bear Lake. They designated approximately 160 acres for development and
hired an engineer to survey, subdivide, and
map-out the acreage. Thereafter, they submitted a plat of the subdivision, designated
1. The plat map filed with the County Commission includes an owner's Declaration and Dedication signed by Alden Siddoway and the following dedication of land for public rights-of-way:
I hereby dedicate and set apart said BLOCK
FOUR (4) Siddoway Sub-Division with the following stipulations and conditions here added:
1. That I relinquish all rights to the new
location of Public Right of Ways (Main Pub-

as Block 4, to the Rich County Commission
for approval. As part of the development,
the Siddoways dedicated various strips of
land for public and private rights-of-way.1
After obtaining the County Commission's
approval, the Siddoways began selling lakefront lots to the public. On August 11, 1958,
the Siddoways sold Lots 80 and 81 of the
Block Four Siddoway Subdivision to Hydroswift Corporation. In 1973, Hydroswift
transferred ownership of the two lots to Mrs.
Ludlow. Mrs. Ludlow, Hydroswift's successor in interest, was the secretary of Hydroswift, a corporation wholly owned by Mrs.
Ludlow and her husband, Roy Ludlow. Although Hydroswift purchased the two lots in
August 1958, it did not record the warranty
deeds to those lots until August 27, 1963.
When purchased in 1958, the east boundary
of both lots abutted a sixty-six foot public
right-of-way for a county road, as indicated
on the plat map filed with the County.
Eleven years later, in 1969, Falula Farms,
the Siddoways* successor in interest,2 petitioned the Rich County Commission to move
the existing sixty-six-foot-wide county road
approximately twenty-two feet to the west
Falula's purpose in moving the road was to
free up more lakefront property for development. To facilitate this move, Falula Farms
executed, on October 30, 1969, a special warranty deed in favor of Rich County, deeding
a sixty-six foot strip of land for the new
county road. In exchange, and on the same
day, Rich County executed a quitclaim deed
to Falula Farms for the twenty-two foot vacated strip of the old county road.
The county road was subsequently moved
twenty-two feet to the west. For the next
eighteen years neither party to this suit
raised the issue of ownership of the vacated
strip of land. However, on August 6, 1987,
Mrs. Ludlow filed a Notice of Claim assertRight of Ways) located and described herein,
and hereby grant and convey them for perpetual public use.
(Emphasis added.)
2.

On January 26, 1962, Alden and Delia Siddoway transferred, by quitclaim deed, their remaining lakefront property to Falula Farms, their
wholly owned corporation.
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jng ownership of the vacated twenty-two foot
strip of land abutting lots 80 and 81. In
opposition to Mrs. Ludlow's claim, Falula
Farms asserted its ownership of the same
strip of land, by virtue of the 1969 quitclaim
deed executed by Rich County to Falula
Farms. Falula Farms thereafter brought
suit to quiet title.
The trial court concluded that Falula
Farms owned the disputed strip of land, subject to Mrs. Ludlow's easement for ingress
and egress, because Utah Code Ann. § 27-17 (1953),3 relied upon by Mrs. Ludlow, was
repealed before Hydroswift recorded its
deeds in 1963. Furthermore, the trial court
held that the recording of the Siddoway Subdivision Plat clearly evidenced the Siddoway's intention to grant ownership only to
the specific tracts of land and not to any part
of the road.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The parties raise four issues on appeal.
However, because it is dispositive, we address only the issue of whether the Siddoway's initial dedication of the county road in
1958 granted an easement or fee title to Rich
County, and if title, whether it was an absolute or a defeasible fee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] A quiet title action necessarily involves an ultimate conclusion of law as to
who owns the disputed piece of property. In
reviewing the trial courts conclusions of law,
we accord them no particular deference but
3. Section 27-1-7 stated, in relevant part, that a
"transfer of land bounded by a highway passes
the title of the person whose estate is transferred
to the middle of the highway." Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-1-7 (1953) (repealed 1963).
4

- The trial court concluded that § 27-1-7 was
not applicable because the legislature repealed it
before Hydroswift recorded its deeds in 1963,
even though the lots had been purchased in
1958. This conclusion is wrong for two reasons.
First, the fact that Hydroswift recorded the deeds
almost five years after it purchased the lots does
not control whether the statute applies. The act
of recording merely protects the property owner
against subsequent good faith purchasers of the
same property who purchased without notice.
Failure to record, however, does not affect the

review them for correctness Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988).
ANALYSIS
[3] Common law principles regarding
highways, roads, and public rights-of-way
prescribe that the public obtains only an
easement in a highway or road dedicated for
public use. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 656
P.2d 465, 471 (Utah 1982) (Howe, J., concurring); Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 761 P.2d
96, 98 (Wyo.1988). Furthermore, at common
law the owner of land which abutted a highway owned up to the middle of the highway.
See Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-7 (1953) (repealed 1963) (replaced by id § 27-12-101
(Supp.1993) (effective 1963)); Hummel v.
Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P.2d 410, 411
(1953). Thus, common law principles gave
the public, represented by local government,
no more than an easement in land dedicated
as a public highway or road. Consequently,
when a city or county abandoned or vacated
a dedicated highway or road, the abutting
landowners owned and possessed the underlying property to the middle of the highway
or road. Mason, 656 P.2d at 471.
In Utah, as well as many other states,
however, the common law principles have
been modified or completely changed by statutory and case law. White v. Salt Lake City,
121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952) ("We
have clearly changed by statute the old common-law rule insofar as streets in platted
subdivisions are concerned.").
Thus, in 1958, when the Siddoways began
developing their property, two seemingly
conflicting statutes 4 were on the books, one
validity of a legitimate conveyance of real property. See Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398
(Utah 1983); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist
Church, 642 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982). Thus,
the date the lots were purchased, not the date the
deeds were recorded, is controlling. Therefore,
§ 27-1-7 applies in this case because Hydroswift
purchased the lots five years before § 27-1-7
was repealed.
Second, although § 27-1-7 was repealed, a
similar provision that retained the common law
principle regarding ownership-to-the-middle-ofthe-highway was enacted at the same-time. See
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (Supp.1993) (enacted 1963). Thus, even if the date of recording
were controlling, the common law principle of
an abutting landowner owning to the center of
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map or plat, and the other statute codifies
representing a codification of the common
the common law as regards other streets.
law and one representing a statutory modifiIn the case of recording a formal map &?
cation of the common law. First, section 275
plat our statutes give the public a fee
1-7 stated:
interest, but in the case of a common law
By taking or accepting land for a highdedication the public acquires merely a
way the public acquires only the right of
right-of-way.
way and incidents necessary to enjoying
and maintaining it. A transfer of land Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465, 471 (Utah
bounded by a highway passes the title of 1982) (Howe, J., concurring) (emphasis addthe person whose estate is transferred to ed). Notably, the Mason court, in a departhe middle of the highway.
ture from the common law, interpreted secUtah Code Ann. § 27-1-7 (1953) (emphasis tion 27-1-7 as not prohibiting the state from
added) (repealed 1963). As noted by several acquiring a fee simple title to a strip of land
early Utah cases, section 27-1-7 codified the used for a highway. Id. at 467.
common law rule. Brown v. Oregon Short Thus, Mason instructs us in this case that
Line R. Co., 36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740, 742 section 57-5-4 controls because the Siddo(1909); Hummel, 265 P.2d at 411.
ways "made, acknowledged, filed and recordSecond, Chapter 5 of Title 57 of the Utah ed" a map of their subdivision with the Rich
Code, dealing with Plats and Subdivisions, County Commission. Therefore, pursuant to
that section, Rich County obtained a fee instated:
Such maps and plats, when made, ac- terest in the strip of land dedicated for the
knowledged, filed and recorded, shall oper- county road.
ate as a dedication of all such streets,
[4] The question remaining is what hapalleys and other public places, and shall
vest the fee of such parcels of land as are pened to the County's fee title when it vacattherein expressed, named or intended for ed part of the old county road. The Utah
public uses in such county, city or town Supreme Court has provided guidance in answering that question by stating that even
for the public for the uses therein named
though the "[legislature did not regard the
or intended.
dedication to the public of a street in a
Utah Code Ann. § 57-5-4 (1990) (emphasis platted subdivision as the surrender of an
added) (repealed 1991) (replaced by id. § 10- easement with retention of the fee to the
9-807 (1992) (effective July 1, 1992)).
corpus in the abutting owner," White v. Salt
To resolve the apparent conflict between Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210, 213
these two statutory provisions, we turn to a (1952), "[i]f the street should cease to serve
1982 decision by the Utah Supreme Court: any public interest, it may be abandoned and,
We held in Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. v. in that case, the right to the use and control
Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 277 P.2d 798 of the roadway would revert to the abutting
(1954) there was no conflict between [sec- owner pursuant to [section 27-1-7] and comtions 27-1-7 and 57-5-4] since the one mon law principles." Id. This language in
statute deals with a dedication made by an White is consistent with Utah Code Ann.
owner who has prepared and recorded a § 27-12-102.5 (Supp.1993) which states:
the highway was codified and in force at all
times during this case, either as § 27-1-7 or
§ 27-12-101.
5. This code provision was earlier found at Utah
Code Ann. § 36-1-7 until its successor, § 27-17, was enacted. Additionally, § 27-1-7 was replaced by Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-101 (Supp.
1993) (enacted 1963), which continued codification of the same common law:
(1) Title to real property acquired by the
department or the counties, cities, and towns

by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise for highway rights-ofway or other highway purposes may be in fee
simple or any lesser estate or interest.
(2) A transfer of land bounded by a highway
on a right-of-way for which 'the public has only
an easement passes the title of the person whose
estate is transferred to the middle of the highway.
Id. (emphasis added).

Cite as 866 P2d 573 (Utah App. 1993)

The action of the county legislative body
vacating or narrowing a county road which
has been dedicated to public use by the
proprietor, shall operate to the extent to
which it is vacated or narrowed . . . as a
revocation of the acceptance thereof and
the relinquishment of the county's fees
therein by the county legislative body.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, White and section 27-12-102.5 compel the conclusion that Rich County originally acquired a defeasible fee simple title,6
rather than an absolute fee, from the Siddoways in 1958.7 Thereafter, pursuant to
White and section 27-12-102.5, the County
lost that fee in 1969 when it vacated part of
the roadway by moving it twenty-two feet to
the west. Consequently, the fee simple title
to the vacated strip of land reverted to Mrs.
Ludlow. Mason, 656 P.2d at 471 (upon
abandonment one-half of highway belongs to
grantee or then present owner and not to
original dedicator); Siegenthaler v. North
Tillamook County Sanitary Auth., 26 Or.
App. 611, 553 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1976) (same).
From that point on, Mrs. Ludlow held the fee
simple absolute title and enjoyed the exclusive right to use and control the twenty-two
foot strip of land.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by concluding as a
matter of law that Falula Farms owned the
disputed strip of land. The County obtained
only a defeasible fee in the land used for a
county road. Once the County vacated part
or all of the roadway, it lost its fee and the
6. Black's Law Dictionary defines a defeasible fee
as "[a]n estate in fee that is liable to be defeated
by some future contingency." Black's Law Dictionary 418 (6th ed. 1990). In addition to the
statutory and case law that compel us to find a
defeasible fee, the language in the recorded plat
regarding dedication of the road to the public for
perpetual use" as a county road is consistent
with our holding. That language arguably created a condition subsequent, the occurrence of
which would divest the County of its fee title, by
stating: "I [Alden Siddoway] hereby . . . relinquish all rights to the new location of Public
Right of Ways and hereby grant and convey them
for perpetual public use." Thus, the County's fee
title to the county road was valid so long as the
strip of land was used by the public as a county
road. The action by the County to vacate part of
that road violated the condition subsequent and

abutting property owner, Mrs. Ludlow,^ succeeded to the fee simple title of that land.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry
of judgment quieting title in the disputed
strip of land in Mrs. Ludlow.
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur.
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Larry L. MOSTRONG and Jennifer
G. Mostrong, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
Lee Roy JACKSON and Margaret
R. Jackson, Defendants and
Appellees.
No. 920578-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 3, 1993.
Purchasers of property sued vendors after property was sold at trustee's sale, and
purchasers alleged negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and mistake. The
Fourth District Court, Millard County, Cullen Y. Christensen, J., found that purchasers
were not entitled to rescission of contract for
purchase of property, and appeal was taken.
worked to divest the County of its fee title to the
vacated strip of land.
7. We note that other western states have also
adopted this position. See, e.g., Sutphin v.
Mourning, 642 P.2d 34, 36 (Colo.App.1981) (statutory provision gave abutting landowners fee title when any roadway designated on plat was
vacated); Bailey v. Ravalli County, 201 Mont.
138, 653 P.2d 139, 143 (1982) (abandonment of
public roadway by county commissioners meant
that fee in street reverted to abutting landowners); Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 761 P.2d 96,
98-99 & n. 2 (Wyo.1988) (dedication of public
highway by filing of map gave town a fee simple
determinable but upon vacation of any platted
street or alleyway town lost all right to property).
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BOYD NELSON, LORRAINE NELSON,
STEPHEN WHITLOCK, and SHEILA
WHITLOCK,

1TUAL DECISION

Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 910400527

s

DATE: Februar
.JUDGE: I YN^
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for trial on Februar} 6, 1995. Plaintiffs appeared
and were represented by James G. Clark. Defendant Provo City was represented by David C.
Dixon. The Court heard testimony and received various documentor

e

matter under advisement. I "he Coui t, aftei carefully considering the e\ idence and arguments

DECISION

\ND PR*
This matter was tried previously and appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals issued an
opinion cited as Nelson v. Provo City, h

The facts are

essentially undisputed, and this Court lists the facts substantially the sam
Appeals.

1

f

Pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1869, the federal government deeded the 900
South street, "Roadway", along with the abutting lands in trust to the local municipal
authority, Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee. The Roadway existed as a public
thoroughfare prior to this conveyance. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs1 predecessors
in interest did not occupy the Roadway or the abutting property at the time of the Townsite
conveyance. Nor do they dispute that the metes and bounds of each subsequent conveyance
ran to the Roadway but did not specifically include it.
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the Roadway to James Dunn, who in 1876
deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to
Plaintiffs Stephen Whitlock and Sheila Whitlock. In 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone received
another portion of the Stubbs parcel. Finally, in 1991, Plaintiffs Boyd Nelson and Lorraine
Nelson received a deed for another portion of the Stubbs parcel.
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the Roadway to John P.R. Johnson, as trustee of
the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, First ward Pasture Company deeded its parcel to
the City. 900 South continued to be used as a public roadway. In August of 1989, the City
attempted to vacate the Roadway, but did not follow proper procedures. Shortly after the
purported vacation, the City rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the property it owned to the
south of the original route and sold the vacated portion of the original route to a commercial
developer. Landowners sued the City claiming a reversionary interest in 1he Roadway from
their property lines to the middle of the Roadway. On July 6, 1992, the trial court entered its
verdict which was appealed. The appellate Court remanded the matter "for consideration of
City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the

2

of legal title to the Roadway and the collective occupants of the city of Provo held equitable
title to the Roadway pursuant to the 1869 Land Patent.
The City subsequently conveyed portions of the property surrounding the Roadway to
different individuals or entities. Plaintiffs have asserted that a conveyance of land abutting a

description which does not include any portion of the Roadway). 1 The Court believes that
Plaintiffs 1 argument would have merit if the City and the collective occupants of the city of

The Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, James Dunn, obtained a deed to his property in
31

rhe metes and bounds description of his deed excluded the street, In the Coin t s

determination, the fact that the City held title to the land on which the Roadwa> A as located
(albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the
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an easement was created when the City received the land in trust which already contained the
Roadway, the holder of the easement would be Provo City and the collective occupants of the

circumstances the easement would merge with the fee. The Court cannot conceive of (and
Plaintiffs have not presented preponderating evidence <

1

he conveyance of property

Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-101 (1953 as amended) states: A transfer of
land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the public has only an easement
passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the highway.

4

that

abutting the Roadway deprives the owners of the underlying fee to the Roadway of their title.2
The Court must now address the manner in which the City exercised its fiduciary
duties as trustee holding title of the underlying fee of the Roadway. The appellate court
determined that the City did not properly vacate the Roadway. However, in fact, it was not
necessary for the City to formally vacate the Roadway because it held the title to the
Roadway in trust. Vacatur procedures only seem necessary when the city simply has an
easement for a road which it no longer intends to use. Thus, even though the city did not
properly vacate the roadway, Plaintiffs could not have suffered damages specifically because
of the improper vacation. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs may be entitled to recovery
for damages caused because of the City's realignment of the street, and these issues will be
addressed in part B of this discussion.
This Court believes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and responsibility
when it determined that it was in the best interest3 of the collective occupants of the city of
Provo to realign the Roadway to create a functional intersection, and when it sold the

2

Hypothetically, suppose the Court accepts Plaintiffs1 theory that the landowner
of property abutting a road impliedly holds title to the middle of the road, and the Court
awarded Plaintiff the property up to the edge of the new road. Also, suppose the City
realigned the road so that the new road started in the middle of the old road. According to
Plaintiffs' theory, he would then be entitled to receive the property up to the middle of the last
road. Now, suppose the City realigned the road again moving it further south. In theory,
under these circumstances, Plaintiffs would be able to increase their acreage again by
claiming property to the middle of the last road without ever purchasing the property. This
theory creates a windfall for an abutting property owner who has never owned (nor has his
predecessors in interest ever owned) title to the underlying fee on which the road is located.
3

The City certainly had authority to exercise its police power to realign the
Roadway for the health, benefit and safety of the public. The issue here is who is entitled to
the property where the old road was located.
5
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enjoying the benefits of a comer lot together with the other benefits of visibility, etc. which
are associated with a property located on a main thoroughfare (particularly on a comer). The
Court, believes Plaintiffs' injury is of the peculiar type which entitles them to compensation
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1974).
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of the injury was approximately September 18, 1991, when the City notified Plaintiffs of its
intent to begin construction on the disputed property and demanded Plaintiffs to remove all
property vehicles, i i||iii|iiiiir!il mil iilllliii IIII illi iiiil IIII llir nlil 'Nlini Smith iimnnli itrl', MHIIII I
their property lines. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. The Court believes that
the actual cause of Plaintiffs injury occurred in August/September of 1989 when 900 South
was realigned taking away Plaintiffs' comer lots. Although the damage perhaps was no! lull I y
realized until construction on the adjoining lot began, it is patently clear that it is the
K

J

...

status. Immediately after the realignment, if a willing purchaser desired to purchase any
parcel of Plaintiffs1 property, the price the willing purchaser would pay for an interior parcel
(which is the present status of Plaintiffs1
the willing purchaser would be willing to pay for a comer lot (which was the former status of
I

property

etermining Plaintiffs1 damages, the value of

purpose:

the damage should be determined as of the fall of 1989.
At trial, each party presented evidence through very qualified appraisers. Plaintiffs1
appuisu IIMIUI ui ni mil lestifinl In Iln i ihn1 ml I1"! iiiillilll

/
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Defendant's appraiser testified as to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of July 1, 1989. In as
much as there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs which valued their loss at the relevant
time period, the Court is left with no choice but to accept the values testified to by
Defendant's appraiser. Consistent with the appraisal prepared by Gary Free & Associates, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs Boyd and Lorraine Nelson suffered damages in the amount of
$17,134 and Plaintiffs Steven and Sheila Whitlock suffered damages in the amount of $3,966.
Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the amount they were damaged at the legal
rate as of August/September of 1989.
The Court has considered the other claims made by Plaintiffs and finds them to be
unsupported by the evidence and without merit. Each party shall be responsible for their own
attorney fees. Counsel for Plaintiffs is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions
of law consistent with this decision.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this 17th day of February, 1995.
BY THE COURT

cc:

James G. Clark, Esq.
David C. Dixon, Esq.
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Defendant's appraiser testified as to the value of Plaintiffs1 loss as of July 1, 1989. In as
much as there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs which valued their loss at the relevant
time period, the Court is left with no choice but to accept the values testified to by
Defendant's appraiser. Consistent with the appraisal prepared by Gary Free & Associates, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs Boyd and Lorraine Nelson suffered damages in the amount of
$17,134 and Plaintiffs Steven and Sheila Whitlock suffered damages in the amount of $3,966.
Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the amount they were damaged at the legal
rate as of August/September of 1989.
The Court has considered the other claims made by Plaintiffs and finds them to be
unsupported by the evidence and without merit. Each party shall be responsible for their own
attorney fees. Counsel for Plaintiffs is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions
of law consistent with this decision.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this 17th day of February, 1995.
BY THE COURT

cc:

James G. Clark, Esq.
David C. Dixon, Esq.
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BOYD NELSON, LORRAINE NELSON,
STEPHEN WHITT OCK, and SHIELA

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
COMn T TSTOVQ O F T ^\y

WHITLOCK,

:
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

P

i,

Defendant.

: (

: Judge Lyra W. Davis f\c\rd < *c\ ,'Jf

i ins matter came betore uic ^oun iw! L„u,miicDiuai\ v.. . ": rLir.i.i;
appeared and were represented by their counsel, James G. Clark. Defendant was r-TT^ented
by counsel David C. Dixon. The Court having heard testimony, received various
documentary evidence, and taken the matter under advisement now. therefore, finds as
follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds the facts of the matter are essentially undisputed, and are

substantially the same as those found by the Court of Appeals as cited in its opinion, Nelson v.
Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994).
A. The court finds that pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1869, the federal
government deeded the 900 South Street, "Roadway", along with the abutting lands in trust
to the local municipal authority, Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee. The Roadway
existed as a public thoroughfare prior to this conveyance. The Court finds that the parties do
not dispute that Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest did not occupy the Roadway at the time
of the Townsite conveyance. The Court further finds that the parties also do not dispute that
the metes and bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to the Roadway but did not
specifically include it.
B. The Court finds that in 1871 Smoot deeded land north of the Roadway to James
Dunn, who in 1876 deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. The Court also finds that in 1982, a
portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to Plaintiffs Stephen Whitlock and Sheila Whitlock.
The court further finds that in 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone received another portion of the
Stubbs parcel, and that in 1991 Plaintiffs Boyd Nelson and Lorraine Nelson received a deed
for another portion of the Stubbs parcel.
C. The Court finds that in 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the Roadway to John
P.R. Johnson, as trustee of the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, First Ward Pasture
2

Company deeded its parcel to the City 900 South continued to be used as a public roadvv a>
In August of 1989, the City attempted to vacate the Roadway, but did not follow proper
f
ont0

"iv rerouted a portion of 900 South
the "• -'v 1 * ii owned to the south of the original route and sold the improperly vacated

portion oi me original route to a commercial developer. Plaintiffs sued the City claiming a
reiei'sioiiai \ niieiesi, in nine h ojii\ ,,n li in men' property lines to the middle of the Roadway.
2. This Court finds that the Court of Appeals held that "the Townsite Act conveyed the
Roadwa* u Cih ' :: ;M ^ r h " Nelson, 872 P.2d at 3S
(
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T-h> case was remanded to consider the
.-.MIL.,

have not presented evidence

that anyone other than the City or the collective occupants of the Cit> were equitable owi lei s • :)f tl le
property prior to the 1869 patent.
3

subsequently conveyed portions oi the property surrounding

the Roadway to different individuals or entities. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs 1 ia\ e asserted
that a conveyance of land abutting a road impliedly conveys the land to the middle of the road (in
spite of a metes and hot inds description which does not include any porti»-:.

!

:; *. . w^iwayV

4. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, James Dunn, obtained a deed to
his property in 1871. The Court also finds that the metes and bounds description of his deed
exclude--, line Mn.vi

1 in- < 'mill finds thai I he l"'il\ In/Id iijje In (he land urn vwinii the R u a d n a ) w a s

located (albeit in trust).
5. The Court finds that the City did not properly vacate the Roadway. However, in fact, it

3

Roadway in trust. Vacatur procedures only seem necessary when the city simply has an easement
for a road which it no longer intends to use.
-6. The Court finds that at Trial Plaintiffs cited Utah cases to the court asserting that they
support the Plaintiffs' claim for compensation for the loss of their corner lots. Defendant cited cases
asserting that the facts of this case do not entitle Plaintiffs to compensation. After carefully
reviewing all of the cases cited by counsel, the Court finds the discussion in Three D Corp. v. Salt
Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah App. 1988) which was cited and followed in Carpet Barn v. State
bv and through DOT, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App. 1990) to be most helpful. In Three D Corp. after
discussing the various precedents, the Court stated:
While it must be conceded that these precedents are not entirely
consistent, we believe they can be largely harmonized if viewed as
establishing three general principles: 1) Where governmental action,
not amounting to a physical taking, effectively deprives a property
owner of reasonable access [sic] to property, the owner is entitled to
compensation, [sic]; 2) Where governmental action, not amounting to
a physical taking, merely interferes with an owner's access to
property, the owner is not entitled to compensation so long as the
owner still has reasonable access, [sic]; 3) Where governmental
action, not amounting to a physical taking, substantially impairs a
right appurtenant to an owner's property, or otherwise causes peculiar
injury and thereby results in substantial devaluation, the owner is
entitled to compensation [sic].
Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1325-26.
The Court finds that although no physical taking occurred, Plaintiffs lost the status of
enjoying the benefits of a corner lot together with the other benefits of visibility, etc, which are
associated with a property located on a main thoroughfare (particularly on a corner).

4

7. The Court finds that the actual cause of Plaintiffs' injury occurred in August/September
of 1989 when 900 South was realigned, taking away Plaintiffs' corner lots. Although the damage
perhaps was not fully realized until construction on the adjoining lot began, it is patently clear that it
is the realignment of the roadway which caused the compensable injury -- the loss of the corner lot
status.
8. The Court finds that two appraisals were presented as evidence. Plaintiffs' appraisal
testified only to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of October of 1991. Defendant's appraiser testified
to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of July 1, 1989.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon testimony of the parties and documentary evidence, and having taken the matter
under advisement, the Court now, therefore, concludes as follows:
1. The Court concludes that no one other than the City or the collective occupants of the
City were equitable owners of the property prior to the 1869 patent and, therefore, the City became
the holder in trust of legal title to the Roadway and the collective occupants of the city of Provo held
equitable title to the Roadway pursuant to the 1869 Land Patent.
2. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' assertion that a conveyance of land abutting a road
impliedly conveys the land to the middle of the road would have merit if the City and the collective
occupants of the city of Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use the road.
3. The Court concludes that the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the grant of an
easement which would carry with it a revisionary interest. Even supposing that an easement was
created when the City received the land in trust which already contained the Roadway, the holder of
5

the easement would be Provo City and the collective occupants of the City of Provo — the same
parties who held title to the underlying fee — under these circumstances the esisement would merge
with the fee.
4. The Court concludes that the City did not properly vacate the roadway; however.
Plaintiffs could not have suffered damages specifically because of the improper vacation.
5. The Court concludes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and responsibility
when it determined that it was in the best interest of the collective occupants of the city of Provo to
realign the Roadway to create a functional intersection, and when it sold the Roadway property
which it held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the general treasury for the
benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo.
6. The Court concludes that the actual cause of Plaintiffs' injury occurred in
August/September of 1989 when 900 South was realigned taking away Plaintiffs' corner lots.
Therefore, for the purposes of determining Plaintiffs' damages, the value of the damage should be
determined as of the fall of 1989.
7. The Court concludes that consistent with the appraisal prepared by Gary Free and
Associates, the Plaintiffs Boyd and Lorraine Nelson suffered damages in the amount of $17,134 and
Plaintiffs Steven and Sheila Whitlock suffered damages in the amount of $3,966. Plaintiffs are
entitled to interest on the amount they were damaged at the legal rate as of August/September of
1989.
8. The Court concludes that the other claims made by Plaintiffs are unsupported by
evidence and without merit.
6

9. The Court concludes that each party should be responsible to pay their own attorney fees.
10. Costs to be determined hereafter awarded pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED AND SIGNED this jj_
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